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JUSTICE BRENNAN AND
THE HUMAN SIDE OF JUDGING
Larry Kramer*
Speaking at this conference has become a nightmare for me.
First, I am the last speaker on an afternoon panel, when everyone is
feeling drowsy after a long and delicious lunch. Second, I have to
follow Richard Arnold, and what could be worse than having to fol-
low Richard. Third, now that I am here, I see that I am completely
out of place. When the organizers of this conference invited me to
speak, I asked who would be on the panel. They listed the names,
and I thought, "Wow. Mikva, Aldisert, Arnold. It would be an
honor to participate." But now that I am up here, I cannot stop
thinking of a rally I saw after the Chicago Bulls won their fourth
championship. They carried each of the trophies out, one at a time,
for the crowd to cheer. Michael Jordan carried one, Scottie Pippen
carried one, Dennis Rodman carried one, and they gave the fourth
trophy to Steve Kerr. Now I suspect that even those of you who are
not basketball fans know the names Jordan, Pippen, and Rodman.
Well, I feel like Steve Kerr.
But here I am. It took me a long time to decide what to say, and
a theme occurred to me only a few weeks ago, after I participated in
a debate sponsored by one of the lawyers' chapters of the Federalist
Society. The debate was entitled, "Justice Brennan: Hero or Vil-
lain?" There were no other choices-just hero or villain-and the
point was to evaluate Justice Brennan's legacy. It was an interesting
event for a number of reasons. I told the audience-I was the last
speaker on that panel as well-that I felt as if I had been let into
someone's bathroom or bedroom, the place where their hair comes
down and they finally reveal what they really think about things. It
was a scary experience. There was so much anger in the room.
Members of the audience actually heckled me throughout the
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event-unable to repress their impatient fury. Others could not con-
trol the impulse to jeer. And I thought to myself, "The Warren Court
and the Great Society ended a long time ago. After so many years in
power, why are you so angry?" It was a reflection, though, of the
audience's deep frustration.
The attitude of the audience toward Justice Brennan was equally
interesting. For as much as they reviled the Justice-and they did-
they also respected him enormously. They respected him not for
what he had done, but merely for the fact that he had done it. Under
his guidance, they said, the Supreme Court remade American soci-
ety. The changes may have been bad, but the audience members
were nevertheless almost in awe at how the Justice had managed to
make them. They seemed really to believe that we live in a society
ruled by judges and that Justice Brennan deserves most of the
credit-or blame. The unreality of this assumption is probably a
topic for a different conversation, but I should at least note my skep-
ticism. I am not skeptical about Justice Brennan's role as a leader of
the Court. Rather, I am skeptical about claims that the Supreme
Court, or any court for that matter, has been a principal mover in
bringing about significant social change. Further, I regard the claim
that we live in a system run by judges as certifiable. The Framers
understood the inherent limits of judicial activism better, it seems,
than their conservative posterity. Courts have never managed to
produce more than the most marginal changes in society unless they
were guided by the legislative and executive branches. Be that as it
may, the members of that audience-and I took them to be repre-
sentative of a larger number of conservatives-were convinced that
Justice Brennan led whatever changes the Supreme Court had man-
aged to make. They saw him as an enormously effective Justice, a
verdict with which I wholeheartedly concur.
The most interesting aspect of the meeting was the utter cer-
tainty of everyone in the room that Justice Brennan achieved what he
did by being Machiavellian in the worst sense of the word: he knew
what he was doing was wrong, they said, he knew it was illegal and
inconsistent with the Constitution, but he did not care. Words like
"arrogant," "evil," and "deceitful" slipped comfortably into the con-
versation to describe how Justice Brennan foisted his personal phi-
losophy on the American people, and most of the audience was
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happy to attribute the worst possible motives to explain the Justice's
decisions.
I told them they were being unfair to Justice Brennan and to the
many other people who shared his views by simply dismissing the
whole crowd as two-faced and deceptive. It is always more sensible,
I argued, to assume that one's opponents approach an issue with the
same good faith we assume in ourselves. This was not a wholly suc-
cessful tack, I am afraid. After hearing my arguments in defense of
Justice Brennan's views, one member of the audience declared that
he now understood why conservatives assumed that liberals must be
lying because, he announced, no one could possibly believe the stu-
pid arguments I was making. As much as the audience admired Jus-
tice Brennan for his effectiveness as a judge, it truly disliked him as a
man.
I found myself surprised and more than a little angry at this
grotesque misperception of who Justice Brennan was and why he
was so effective. They had not just missed what it was that made
Justice Brennan a special kind of judge, but they had it exactly
backwards.
Before elaborating, let me mention a few things that, in my
view, do not explain why Justice Brennan was special. First, his
success as a judge was not attributable to his having an especially
powerful intellect or being a dazzling legal analyst. Do not misun-
derstand, the Justice was extremely smart. The analysis in countless
of his opinions is powerful and ingenious. The cases discussed by
Judges Mikva and Aldisert--cases like New York Times v. Sullivan
and Baker v. Carr,2 for example-were brilliantly conceived, par-
ticularly if one evaluates them in their historical context. The same
could be said for many of the Justice's less momentous decisions, too
many to list. Consider, for example, Monell v. Department of Social
Services,3 in which Justice Brennan persuasively justified overturn-
ing an interpretation of Section 19834 that precluded municipal li-
ability;5 or his scholarly dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658-704 (1978).
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Scanlon, which makes an impressive case for limiting sovereign im-
munity under the Eleventh Amendment to diversity cases. But
while Justice Brennan was a first-rate lawyer, he served with many
equally impressive colleagues. One simply cannot say that, as a
lawyer or an intellectual, Justice Brennan surpassed Justices like
Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stevens, Scalia, Rehnquist, or
White. Yet he did surpass them as a judge.
Nor is Justice Brennan's greatness attributable to his success as
a coalition builder. The Justice was indeed a coalition builder-
though by the time I clerked for him, in 1986, "building a coalition"
mostly meant putting into the opinions whatever was necessary to get
that difficult fifth vote, with the idea that we could sort out whatever
mess we created in later cases. The Justice was, in this sense, a suc-
cessful accommodationist, with the patience to let his positions un-
fold slowly. His ability to mold the Court's doctrine over time thus
was indeed remarkable. But, again, in my view, this was not what
made the Justice special.
What made Justice Brennan special as a judge was who he was
as a person. He was extraordinary in many ways, but in one quality
especially. He was, so far as I observed, someone who did not hate:
someone without anger, without malice, without bitterness. He is the
only person I have ever met about whom this could be said. The rest
of us have things that get under our skin, things that make us spiteful
and small. And whether we like it or not, whether we admit it or not,
that dark side plays a part in molding our judgments, often without
our knowing it. This simply was not true of Justice Brennan. Hate
simply was not in him or part of him. To be sure, he sometimes
acted as if he were angry, as if he disliked someone or hated some-
thing. But his heart was never really in it. The cheeriness that eve-
ryone who met him experienced was always there, peeking through.
It was as if, in expressing anger, Justice Brennan was going through
the motions, trying to act like the rest of us. But a grin and a self-
conscious chuckle were invariably just beneath the surface.
This is a slightly different point from one that is often made
about Justice Brennan: that he was a lovely, charming man. He was
6. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a lovely charming man. But that was a product of the quality I am
talking about, which was inborn. Justice Brennan had a genuine, al-
most automatic empathy for everyone and everything. I could be
wrong here-there are people on this panel and in the audience who
knew the Justice far better than I did. But this was my impression,
viewed from the peculiar, and peculiarly close, vantage afforded to a
law clerk. I should add, as well, that I worked for Justice Brennan
during the dark days, or what we thought of as the dark days: when
the Justice had long ceased winning frequently, when we were pro-
ducing two to three times as many dissents as opinions for the Court,
when we talked about "defensive denials" of certiorari and could call
the clerk's office to tell them to run the "usual" dissent in capital
cases because we were running it so often.
What made Justice Brennan an extraordinary judge was how this
unique personal quality shaped and was part of his judging. This
thought first occurred to me at a talk given by another former Bren-
nan clerk, Richard Posner. Judge Posner has devoted considerable
time and effort to the study of reputation, including a book about
Justice Cardozo subtitled "A Study in Reputation"' in which he tries
to decipher the source of Cardozo's immense prestige. 7 There are, I
suppose, many different qualities that can make a judge memorable
or earn a great reputation. In the case of Justice Brennan, however, it
was his ability to let who he was as a person shape who he was as a
judge.
Justice Brennan believed in the goodness of people. He be-
lieved in the dignity of each individual and in the capacity of each
person to be better. He believed these things not in some abstract
philosophical sense, but in his blood, naturally and instinctively. He
confronted evil, of course, and he saw people do terrible things. His
opposition to racism and sexism and the death penalty was heartfelt.
But the way he responded to these wrongs was motivated less by an-
ger at the perpetrators than by a belief that they could learn, could
change, could be better. The Justice understood that people make
mistakes and commit evil acts. He understood that people are often
less than their best selves. He understood that institutions made up
of people acting in complete good faith could still do terribly wrong
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990).
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things. But his decisions and his judgments reflected a deep and
abiding faith in the possibility of progress. He believed that the Con-
stitution could inspire and encourage us to be better and to do better.
A lot of complex issues still need to be sorted out before we can
turn such ideas into a jurisprudence. There are questions that need to
be asked about the role of judges and precedent, about separation of
powers and democracy, about translating concepts over time and fi-
delity to text and to history. But fundamentally, it was this simple
quality of believing in people and never hating them that lay at the
heart of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence and that constituted the fun-
damental motivating force behind his choices and his judgments.
I am loath to say much by way of predicting Justice Brennan's
legacy. His work may or may not stand the test of time. We may
one day find that everything he did or tried to do has been rejected,
his major decisions repudiated or abandoned. Yet even then, I sus-
pect, he will be remembered as one of the great Justices of the Su-
preme Court, if only for the goodness and the humanity of his opin-
ions and his life.
I have spent much of the past five years studying history, and
one of the remarkable things I have observed is how history has a cu-
rious way of remembering well those who-like Justice Brennan-
act on the basis of hope and faith that we could be better rather than
cynicism that we could be worse. It is why, given a choice, most of
us would rather be Jefferson than Adams, or Madison rather than
Hamilton, or Lincoln rather than Taney-or anyone else in Lincoln's
generation. It is why most of us would rather be Louis Brandeis or
Earl Warren than George Sutherland or Felix Frankfurter. It is why
the public that rejected Richard Nixon still embraces Bill Clinton.
For all his weaknesses and flaws, most people sense that Clinton be-
lieves in them, whereas no one who heard those awful tapes could
see Nixon as anything other than a spiteful, hate-filled man. Not that
history forgets the cynics or the haters, but it favors men and women
who are like Justice Brennan, and for good reason. As a person, and
so as a judge, and a public figure, Justice Brennan inspired people to
strive to do better. It is an admirable legacy.
